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Much has been written about a shift in federal to state relationships during the 1990s.  Couched in 
terms of a renewed fiscal federalism, devolution, or even the heady rhetoric of “reinventing” 
government both resources and public service authority flowed to the state governments.  As an 
example, using a mixture of carrots and sticks, the federal government instituted welfare reforms 
in the late 1990s intended to move more welfare recipients into the workforce by limiting 
eligibility terms and mandating training and workforce participation. 
 
Somewhat less was said at the time regarding state governments’ relationships with local 
governments or the extent of federal re-distributions of resources beyond state governments to 
local governments.  In short, the discussion about federalism tended to center on national and 




From the mid 1990s on, most states have been concerned with managing their historic and 
emerging commitments to their dependent populations, maintaining their overall business 
competitiveness by paring their tax structures, balancing their desire to attract businesses with 
their desire to invest in educational systems at all levels, and maintaining safer communities 
leading to the widespread adoption of mandatory minimum sentencing and increases in the 
number of prisons. 
 
Some of these issues cross jurisdictions:  income and health care maintenance responsibilities for 
the disabled and income eligible fall jointly with the federal and state governments, and to a 
lesser extent to local governments.  Issues over economic development and the maintenance of 
essential services are both state and local issues.  Maintaining education quality is also a joint 
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1 There were articles addressing federal to state and to local issues, to include Watson and Gold (1997); 
Kettl (2000); and Honadle (2001).    2
undertaking of state and local government, with state governments increasingly responsible for 
equalizing access to educational resources and with establishing statewide standards of 
performance.  Of late the federal government has weighed-in in this area with the No Child Left 
Behind provisions, although the current fiscal value of this requirement to the states and local 
governments is somewhat vague.  And the public safety and prison provisions fall mainly on the 
states, although burgeoning prison populations have stressed community corrections systems. 
 
Authority, accountability, and the allocation of resources among the many governments are the 
main parts of fiscal federalism.  Historically, the federal government led this evolution of 
governing systems by either directly providing or funding federal mandates at the state and local 
levels.  State governments, too, mostly in education and in the administration of justice, have 
taken the lead in assuring that certain essential services are distributed equitably and effectively 
throughout their jurisdictions.  Over time, as cities and counties across the U.S. matured, there 
were increments to home rule authority that helped to transform local government activities and 
redefine their relationships with the states and, sometimes, the federal government.   
 
This paper is an investigation of some of the federalism transformations that occurred in the past 
decade or so.  In particular, it assesses the flow of resources and spending at all levels of 
government and sorts out which show changes in relationships.  It has four sections.  First is a 
general overview of fiscal federalism in the U.S.  The second looks at the flow of federal funds 
into state and local governments over the past decade, primarily, and the sources and 
consequences of fiscal stress realized by state governments during the early 2000s.  The third 
section looks at whether federal to state and state to local transfers changed markedly over the 
1990s and how those changes might be attributed.  A spatial dimension is explored to see which 
states were accumulating gains or losses during this period.  Sets of state and local government 
shifts in capacity are measured with regard to governmental receipts, and whether there were 
major regional patterns in governmental ability to provide goods and services to citizens.  Last we 
look at the state fiscal shock of 2000 through 2002 to see whether there were interruptions in the 
flow of federal to state and state to local funds. 
 
We look at two recent periods for most of the state and local government analysis: 1992 to 2000 
(the Clinton Administration), where much of the recent federalism talk and activity was centered.  
This was also a period of sustained economic expansion.  The next time is 2000 to 2002.  The 
year 2000 was a historical peak in real state governmental receipts, and 2002 was a year that, for 
many states, tax cuts, depletions of rainy day funds, and a general economic slowdown conspired 
to reduce state government own-source revenues sharply. 
   
There are two important patterns of governmental activity that we are especially interested in 
tracking: federal and states are increasingly liable for public health costs, primarily because of 
expansions in the Medicaid-eligible populations coupled with faster-than-inflation rises in health 
costs.  At a different level, states and local governments have strongly emphasized education 
spending, driven by concerns of interstate competitiveness, beginning way back in the Reagan 
Administration, and of late, associated with the federal “No Child Left Behind” initiative to 
stimulate better public school outcomes.  We begin with an overview of federalism.   3
 An Overview of Federalism 
 
During the Clinton Administration, in particular the 104
th Congress, there was renewed discussion 
and debate on federalism and the functional and fiscal relationship among the federal and the 
state governments.
2  This increased attention coincided at a time when federal program 
responsibility was said to be devolving and, accordingly, delegated to the states and, further, in 
some instances, to local governments.  The most emblematic federal program change and 
program and policy devolution involved the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act.  It fostered broad changes in both the structure of funding for and the 
performance expectations of welfare recipients – mostly low income single women with 
dependent children.  States were rewarded financially for applying innovative and effective 
strategies for moving welfare mothers into the workforce.  As in times before, the federal 
government was going to shift from strings-attached categorical funding to discretionarily vague 
block grant funding.  According to Inman and Ruben (1997), we perhaps were witnessing a 
“quite revolution (p. 55).”  Richard Musgrave (1997) was dubious, and observed that it 
historically was the case and would likely happen that the block grants would be insufficient to 
cover the cost of the transferred authority at the state level. 
 
Federalism, as a social or political factor that matters practically and substantively, ebbs and 
flows over time.   The extension of federal authority, resources, and action to sub-national 
governments and issues, primarily, is determined by several factors that may or may not work in 
concert with one another.  Some of these are 
 
•  Political or policy imperatives:  every president has a different perspective on the 
appropriate role and scope of federal activity in support of state or local governments.  
Large ideological differences are evident between, for example, the administrations of 
Johnson and Reagan, leading to different relationships and expectations among the 
federal and sub-national governments. 
•  Constitutional provisions: the 10
th amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserves certain 
areas of state authority, irrespective of federal intentions to the contrary. 
•  Broad social changes:  general, incremental transformations in science, society, and 
culture alter governmental authority and citizen expectations from governments. 
•  Economic issues: economic scarcity or largess affects government capacity and authority 
– large portions of modern government were originally launched as responses to broad 
national and global economic failures during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
•  Prerequisites of distributive justice: affirmative action, equal opportunity, environmental 
remediation, regulations to internalize harmful production outcomes, and efforts to 
mitigate resource mal-distributions among individuals and regions all fit into this 
category. 
•  Big events:  September 11, 2001, for one, and hurricane Katrina, for another, are 
emblematic of the need for flexible federal responses in the face of natural, economics, or 
political disasters to directly assist or leverage state or local government and quasi-
governmental capacities. 
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Historically, depression era New Deal programs greatly expanded the influence of the federal 
government in the economy and in society.  These initiatives resulted in funding flows, via a host 
of agencies and programs, to individuals, states, and quasi-governmental entities chartered to 
promote social or economic well-being (like the Tennessee Valley Authority). 
 
Intergovernmental fiscal relationships were much further extended during the early years of Great 
Society social welfare programming at the federal government level.  New programs resulted in 
the flow of funds to states and communities as grants and as entitlement payments (either as cash 
or commodities) to individuals.  President Johnson’s Model Cities programs extended federal 
resources to cities, quasi-community, and neighborhood entities. This period of expanding fiscal 
federalism, sometimes criticized as “creeping federalism”
3 continued through the Nixon 
Administration.  A wide array new programs, grants, and transfers were enacted for employment 
and training, general revenue sharing, regional planning and programming, funding for new 
environmental laws, food and nutrition assistance to the poor, and city and state infrastructure and 
human services block grants.  During the Ford and Carter Administrations, most of the basics of 
fiscal federalism remained. Carter’s administration tried to focus aid, as in the Urban 
Development Action Grants for housing assistance, and developed counter-cyclical jobs 
programs in coordination with the states. 
 
This period of active federal involvement was confronted head-on by the Reagan Administration.  
From the beginning, it articulated an idea of “New Federalism” that was going to redefine the 
multitude of federally-administered categorical programs into a subset of super-grants or block 
grants.  The tradeoff for what everyone soon realized was to be an overall net reduction in federal 
funds was fewer federal strings attached and a promise of greater state level autonomy and 
authority for programming.
4  Important categories of federal funding for housing, general revenue 
sharing, and categorical health and income maintenance relief were either eliminated or 
repackaged with large block grants for urban development, social services, health care, workforce 
security, and environmental regulation and remediation. 
 
We can chart the federal fund flows to state and local governments over the years.  Figure 1 
identifies federal grants-in-aid as fractions of state and local government receipts over a 35 year 
span.  A general upward trend is apparent through 1978 when federal funds accounted for almost 
23 percent of all state and local government revenues.  We see, too, the sharp reduction in grants-
in-aid during Reagan Administration (1981 through 1988).  Federal funds as a percentage of local 
government revenues had declined to 14.2 percent by 1987.   An apparent renaissance of fiscal 
federalism followed through the 1999 period where the fraction of state and local receipts from 
federal sources increased to 18.9 percent by the end of the Clinton years.    
 
                                                 
3 The term’s origin is difficult to trace, but was applied occasionally to the persistent inveigling of federal 
power and authority into the affairs of issues thought reserved to the states.  By way of measure, the sum of 
government and government authority in 1960 was tremendously different than that in, say, 1976, but 
changes from year to year were, generally, incremental. 
4 At the time, once the accumulating value of the cuts were realized, these reforms were occasionally called 
“fend-for-yourself federalism.”   5
A huge spike upward followed driven mostly by constrained own source government receipts at 
the state and local level because of the recession (shrinking the denominator) and by increased 
federal effort for the sake of homeland security following the events of September 11, 2001.  
Taken as a whole, federal fiscal flows into sub-national governments in 2003 appeared at or very 
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A different picture emerges when we remove Medicaid grants from the grants-in-aid amounts.  
Medicaid grants are health services entitlements paid to low income (traditional income-
maintenance welfare) recipients and their children through programs and services administered 
and fund-matched by the states.   Medicaid payments also support the much more expensive 
medical needs of the disabled and the low-income elderly (who also receive Medicare)
6.  When 
those payments are removed, federal fiscal federalism net of Medicaid spending did not rise 
meaningfully during the end of the Reagan years through the end of Clinton’s term.  In 1988 
federal aid excluding Medicaid amounted to 9.6 percent of state and local receipts.  By the end of 
2000 it was 9.8 percent.  The federal percentage spiked in 2003 at 12 percent following a huge 
flow of homeland security funds into state and local governments.  
  
The rhetoric of a resurgent federalism via additional block grants and state and local authority and 
programming has to differentiate between the Medicaid and the non-Medicaid portions of federal 
aid.  Doing so, we indirectly validate Musgrave’s (1997) concern that a half century of “fiscal 
activism and federal leadership (68).” had ended.  By the end of 2004, at least half of the grants to 
state and local governments were made up of Medicaid payments, compared to 16 percent in 
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program.   6
1978.  For the vast majority of state and local government programs and citizens for whom 
Medicaid funding is not an issue, the federal fraction of the state and local supply of available 
revenues is and has been fixed at about the 10 percent level since the end of the 1980s.  
Regarding this aspect of federal fiscal activism, in the non-entitlement area, the Reagan 
Administration’s policies have proved incredibly durable.  This durability is further demonstrated 
in Figure 2. 
 
Here we show three measures of the size of government in the U.S. relative to the rest of the 
economy.  The first two measures are of federal and of state & local government investment and 
consumption as fractions of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
7  In 1970, the federal government 
was 11 percent of GDP and declined relatively persistently through 1979 to 8.2 percent.  During 
the Reagan years, especially because of a federal expansion in defense-related spending at the 
heights of the Cold War, the federal share of GDP grew to 9.8 percent by 1986.  Thereafter, the 
federal share declined persistently through 2000 where it reached its recent historic low of 5.9 
percent.  Since, through 2005, the federal share has grown to 7 percent. 
 
Figure 2 
Federal and State & Local Government Investment 
































Federal Direct Payments to Individuals
 
State & local governments’ shares have not seen such dramatic swings.  The high point for state 
and local governments was 12.7 percent of GDP in 1975, and the low was 10.7 percent in 1984.  
The state and local share has remained relatively flat, but rose some during the 1998 to 2002 
period to 12.2 percent of GDP. 
 
The federal shares do not include the payments to individuals that are made on their behalf.  We 
added those values for illustrative purposes.  Those payments include all payments in support of 
social security, income maintenance, Medicare, payments to veterans and their care, and direct 
                                                 
7 The government consumption component of GDP includes the purchase of all goods, services, and 
structures from businesses, employee compensation (purchases from households), the consumption of 
capital and the purchase of fixed assets, and deductions of government enterprises.  It does not include 
transfer payments or purchases by government enterprises (utilities, for example), interest paid or received, 
and transactions in government assets.   7
spending on education and training.  Those values grew rapidly from 5.4 percent in 1970 to about 
10 percent by 1976.  Since, they have never gone below 8 percent (1979) nor higher than the 10 
percent threshold of 1976.  A better handle on all federal obligations is gained when payments to 
individuals are combined with the other federal figures.  When added together, the fractions of 
GDP from total federal spending along with payments to individuals still declined persistently 
during most of the 1990s, but have since risen to 16.7 percent in 2005. 
  
Figure 3 tracks federal aid to states and local governments both with and without Medicaid.  All 
grants-in-aid declined from 1979 through 1982, and increased thereafter.  With Medicaid, real 
grants-in-aid grew from $150.7 million in 1979 to $357.8 million in 2003, over 137 percent.  
Excluding Medicaid, federal aid grew from 121.9 million in 1979 to 188.5 million by 2003, or 56 
percent, before tailing off some.    
  
Figure 3 

































A rising tide lifts all boats, we are reminded, and robust economic growth needs to be taken into 
account when comparing government revenue and spending activity over time.  Over this period 
of time (1979 to 2003) total U.S. real personal income rose by 108 percent, personal income per 
capita rose by 60 percent, and the nation’s population rose by 29 percent.  Governmental 
spending and personal economic statistics are combined and analyzed in the next section. 
 
Sorting Out Recent State Government Fiscal Stress 
 
There are several things that we know about state governments during the 1990s.  First, both real 
tax collections per capita and real aid from the federal government increased strongly.  Second, 
accordingly, there were real per capita increases in state direct and indirect spending during this 
time (see Swenson and Deller, 2001, for analysis of changes in 1992 to 1997) – state governments 
were expanding the scope of public goods delivered.  Third, the vast majority of states reduced 
their personal and corporation income tax rates or they expanded exemptions to individual and 
corporate taxation (Johnson 2002).  Fourth, by 2002 most states were complaining loudly of fiscal   8
stress, as a combination of tax rate cuts, tax shifts, took their tolls on state collections.   Last, there 
is a lack of consensus as to the causes of the states’ fiscal stress; if indeed cause is the right word. 
 
Contrasting explanations for this interstate mess can be found among two prominent 
organizations that address economic and federalism issues.  The Cato Institute, a libertarian think 
tank, issued a report at this time (Edwards 2003) condemning the whole of the 50 states for tax 
and spending excesses.  In rebuttal, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), a more 
liberal, government-service oriented think tank, argued that there were very strong structural 
reasons for rapid state growth during the 1990s.  These were due to the baby boom echo driving 
educational system demands and the increase of the number of elderly and other deserving 
entitlement recipients created expansions in demands for welfare based state services (McNichol 
2003).     
 
Cato argued that states should have reduced spending to a “natural rate” of increase based on 
inflation and population growth, that the excess should have been returned sooner to citizens, and 
that states should consider lowering public costs by privatizing services (p14).  CBPP argued 
further that states in an effort to maintain their tax rate competitiveness broadly lowered rates 
beyond what was prudent, in what is conventionally called a race to the bottom, and that also put 
them in a tenuous position during the economic downturn. 
 
Both reports are selective in their methodologies and their facts.
8  Still, they contain large 
elements of truth.  First, to the growth in state taxes and other receipts, real tax collections per 
capita by state government rose from $1,632 in 1992 to $2,086 by 2000, an increase of 28 percent 
or a 3.1 percent compounded annual rate of change.  Total aid from the federal government rose 
over this same period by 3 percent annually.  Total state government general revenue increased 
by an annual real rate of 3 percent as well.  Figure 4 illustrates the patterns of change over time 
for the states. 
 
Real personal income per capita rose by 3 percent annually over this period.  The claim that total 
state government general receipts drastically exceeded either inflation or population growth in 
and of itself may have been correct, but receipts as fractions of income remained quite constant 
(Figure 2 illustrates the overall stability of combined state and local activity relative to national 
product).  Real tax receipts per person stayed flat in 2001 and then declined in 2002 by almost 7 
percent before recovering in 2004 to a level still below the 2000/2001 peaks.  Non-tax own-
sources posted real growth per capita during the 1990s and declined, too, during the downturn.  
Federal funds, however, though growing relatively consistently with income growth during the 
1990s grew by almost 27 percent between 2000 and 2004. 
 
                                                 
8 Cato mixes displays of inflation adjusted and unadjusted numbers in their presentations making it 
somewhat problematic to sort value from hyperbole.  CBPP asserts that state spending growth was slower 
than income growth given the period that they measure.  The claim is true, but barely; on a per capita basis 
the spread is much more meager than claimed in their research.   9
Figure 4 

















The states had strong growth in real tax collections per capita, and they began to trim tax 
collections.  According to the CBPP, 43 states enacted tax cuts between 1994 and the end of 
2000.  The effects of these cuts are displayed in Figure 5.  This graph illustrates the value of the 
cut state taxes against the previous year’s collections for the whole U.S.  It is evident that cuts 
began in earnest in the mid 1990s waned by 1997, and then they increased again before the period 
when the states found themselves in their 2002 through 2003 period of revenue stress.  By 2002 






When comparing Figures 4 and 5 we see that even though the states were cutting tax rates, their 
real collections continued to rise on a persistent upward slope, nonetheless.  On the face of it, the 
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tax cutting that occurred during this time appears to have made sense.  Whether those cuts were 
or continue to be imprudent remains to be seen. 
 
State and Local Government Revenue and Expenditure Patterns, 1992 to 2000 
 
Did a renewed flow of federal aid to state governments stimulate state tax collections, tax 
reductions, or changes in state government spending?  Did expansions in state government 
activity during the 1990s find their way into state government transfers in support of local 
governments – a trickling down as it were?  Did renewed discussions about fiscal federalism that 
coincided largely with federal and state welfare reforms have corollaries at the state to local 
levels?
10  As has been shown, questions about the overall size of federal and state & local 
government activity need to be tempered and placed into context – too broad of an aggregation 
distorts.  Through the 1990s, the federal share of the economy declined (both in terms of direct 
spending and transfers).  State & locals’ shares remained relatively fixed.  In recent years, owing 
to heightened concern over national safety, wars, and natural devastation, the federal share of the 
nation’s economy has grown. 
 
Table 1 lists the average annual real changes per capita in select general revenue and expenditure 
items.  Both state and local government revenues increased in real terms – state government by 
$99, and local governments by $72 per year, per person.  Real per capita income growth averaged 
$760.62 per year.  Looking first at the revenues, we see that 56 percent of state real growth per 
capita from 1992 to 2000 was due to tax increases, and 27 percent from federal funds increases.  
   
For local governments, however, the preponderance of gain was in aid from the state. It 
accounted for 43 percent in their general revenue growth.  The remainder was split between all 
taxes (27 percent) and all non-taxes (25 percent). 
 
The expenditure side tells us the uses for which gains were put.  State direct spending rose by 
$55.78, and local direct spending rose by $67.49.  The largest amount of gain for state 
governments per capita was in welfare spending at a third of the total, followed by direct state 
spending for education at about a quarter of the total.  Expanded spending on corrections is often 
considered a major portion of state government shifting obligations in the 1990s, but in this 
period they only accounted for 8 percent of the change. 
 
For local governments, a majority 56 percent of direct spending gains went to education, followed 
by 28 percent in the inclusive all others (which is split among all solid waste, sewerage, general 
obligation bond interest payments, and parks and recreation spending, mainly). 
 
                                                 




of Change 1992 to 2000
Composition 
of Change
General Revenues 98.95             100% 71.81             100%
From Federal 26.70             27% 3.65               5%
From State N/A N/A 30.74             43%
Taxes 55.68             56% 19.65             27%
Charges 8.99               9% 13.37             19%
Miscellaneous 6.89               7% 4.39               6%
Per Capita Income 760.62          
Direct General 
Expenditure 54.78             100% 67.49             100%
Education 13.39             24% 37.71             56%
Health 3.52               6% 3.00               4%
Hospitals (0.42)              -1% 0.85               1%
Welfare 18.13             33% (1.24)              -2%
Corrections  4.53               8% 1.23               2%
Law Enforcement 1.13               2% 4.40               7%
Highways 4.92               9% 2.51               4%
All Other              9.59  18%            19.02  28%
State Government Local Government
Annual Real Changes Per Capita
 
 
For state governments, taxes led the way in revenue gains, and welfare costs led in direct 
expenditures.  For local governments, general revenue gains attributable to state transfers were 
more important than tax increases.  A question follows as to whether increased federal funds, 
primarily for Medicaid funding, stimulated by necessity state government tax increases to fund 
the states’ shares of Medicaid match payments or whether states increased taxes were for other 
purposes. 
 
In Figure 6 the real value of all state aid to local governments per capita has increased since the 
mid-1980s.  From 1992 through 2002, the amount (in constant dollars) increased from $930 to 
$1,235, or by a third.  State aid to non-education intentions did not rise as rapidly.  In 1992 that 
amount was $349, and in 2002 $429, an increase of 23 percent. 
 
Two elements of modern fiscal federalism have emerged.  The majority of the federal aid to states 
is in Medicaid transfers, with only modest positive change in all other federal assistance 
categories.  For the state governments 65 percent of transfers to local governments are for 
education, and that percentage has been growing since the mid 1980s.  Sorting out the dynamics 
of federalism compels us to control for these two patterns of change. 
   12
Figure 6 




















































State Aid Exluding Education
 
 
We get an idea of the interstate variability in these several measures with a basic correlation 
matrix in Table 2.
11  Real gains in state tax collections had a decent correlation with state per 
capita income gains (r = .63), as would be expected if income gains were captured by progressive 
state tax systems.  Growth in state taxes was not influenced strongly by non-welfare federal aid (r 
= .32), however, nor at all from the flow of federal aid for welfare (r = -.07).  In particular, there 
was no correlative evidence that state level shifts in Medicaid spending (as measured by the flow 
of federal welfare receipts) was causing gains on state taxes to make match payments.    
 
Interestingly, and borne by our previous discussion, the strongest correlation on the table is the 
relationship between total state taxes and the delivery of education-based state aid to local 
governments (r = .65).  State government tax effort, at least as it varied across states in a standard 
manner, appeared to be flowing strongly towards local government as education assistance.  That 
flow appeared doubly beneficial for local governments in the U.S. as state aid for education was 
strongly correlated with a reduction in local property tax effort (r = -.62), the majority of which in 
the U.S. are generated for education.
 12 
 
                                                 
11 In anticipation the next portion of this section, all of the variables were transformed into amounts that 
represented positive and negative shifts in real per capita revenue items.  This is accomplished by 
calculating each state’s real change in a particular variable per capita that was in excess of or deficient from 
the national weighted average.  This allows us to identify spatially who were, compared to the national 
average, gaining or losing ground on a particular measure.  Each state’s value, then, varies plus or minus 
around an expected deviation of zero (i.e., the national change component). 
 
12 These data included all 50 states.  When Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because their income and 
public finance values are often outliers, the relation between real per capita income and state tax collection 
goes down to r = .321, and the relation between state taxes and intergovernmental education aid to local 
government reduces slightly to r = .575.  The correlation between state aid and property taxes increases 


















Real Per Capita Income 0.631
IG From Fed (Non Welfare) 0.319
IG From Fed (Welfare) -0.065 -0.125
Property Taxes -0.109 0.078 -0.020
IG From State (Non-education) 0.390 0.269 0.097 0.240
IG From State (Education) 0.650 0.258 -0.048 -0.615 0.161
Table of Correlations: Real Per Capita Shifts, 1992 to 2000
 
 
Figure 7 gives us some of the national distributions of the shifts that were measured in the 
aggregate.  The purpose of this display is to see whether there were geographic clusters of 
changes.  In each, the shaded value represents states that deviated positively (or desirably) from 
the national expected values (the weighted average rates of change for all states).  These values 
are real amounts per capita per year for the 1992 to 2000 period.  The shift in federal Medicaid 
payments per capita demonstrate large groupings in the southwestern states, the retirement states 
including Florida, along with Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Montana in 
the plains region – areas with high elderly and other dependent populations. 
 
The states with positive shifts in tax collections are somewhat more tightly grouped.  Except for 
Iowa, a very large cohesive block of middle and upper plains states stretching west through 
Colorado and Utah realized net gains in tax collections. 
 
Shifts in state aid to local government for education also seem to be spatially cohesive.  The 
swath extends from the Great Lake states of Michigan and Ohio over to the Mid and South 
Atlantic, all through the Gulf states, and on west through Arizona.  Another block is evident in 
the Midwest and in the extreme Pacific Northwest.   
 
Negative shifts in property tax collections per person appear much less spatially cohesive.  The 
majority are northern states, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Wyoming and Montana among them. 
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Figure 7 
Real Annual Shifts is Selected State and Local Indicators, 1992 to 2000
 
 
State and Local Government Revenue and Spending Patterns, Fiscal 2000 to 2002 
 
Figure 4 showed the sharp reduction in state government tax collections comparing fiscal 2000 
with 2002 and later.  We have shown that the expected positive or stimulating effects of federal 
funds shifting, of devolution in general down to the state level during the 1990s, did not appear to 
cause major shifts in state government activities during the earlier period. 
 
During the crisis years of 2002 and 2003, however, many states, feeling tax revenue pinched, 
argued that they were having trouble coming up with their match values for Medicaid to the poor 
– that a major fiscal crisis was looming regarding their collective abilities to generate enough 
state revenues to maintain their historic and accumulating obligations for all state spending along 
with welfare related activities.  They urged and argued for federal relief, a bail-out as it were, and 
an increased federal share of Medicaid payments to tide them over the crisis.  They also began to 
argue strongly for Medicaid spending and health care spending reform in general. 
 
Table 3 gives an idea of the real per capita revenue and spending outcomes comparing 2000 with 
2002.  All state government taxes declined in the U.S. by almost $81.  These losses were offset 
strongly by gains of nearly $67 per capita in federal aid.  During this period of fiscal stress, the 
continued increased flow of federal aid proved beneficial to state accounts.  Even though general   15
revenues were essentially flat at this time, the states still realized almost $100 in real per capita 
direct spending increases.  Some of these expenditures were made possible by drawing on state 
rainy day funds that were compiled during better years.   Some, in states where it is allowed, was 
from borrowing.  Notably, the states’ obligations for welfare spending increased to almost $45 
per capita – 45 percent of the growth in state direct spending.  In the previous 1992 to 2000 
period, this category averaged just over $18 per year.  The welfare category, 80 percent of which 
is attributable to Medicaid spending for the low income elderly and disabled recipients, was 






2000 to 2002 2000 to 2002
General Revenues 1.48                       64.45                 
From Federal 66.62                     11.49                 
From State N/A 24.01                 
Taxes (80.77)                   19.78                 
Charges 11.50                     10.02                 
Miscellaneous 1.72                       (0.85)                  
Per Capita Income (312.27)                
Direct General 
Expenditure 99.41                     92.69                 
Education 22.54                     33.55                 
Health 0.58                       5.84                   
Hospitals 4.01                       5.67                   
Welfare 44.80                     3.86                   
Corrections  1.50                       2.40                   
Law Enforcement 0.28                       5.36                   
Highways 7.80                       3.01                   
All Other 17.91                     33.00                 
State Government




While the states were in a tight fiscal jam, local governments’ situation seemed much better.  
Local governments had $64.45 in annual per capita gains.  State aid was $24 of that, local taxes 
nearly another $20, federal aid increases were $11.50, and the rest came from increased charges.  
The positive shift in federal aid reflected flows attributable to increased homeland security 
funding during the first year of crisis following the events of September 11, 2001.  Local 
spending was also robust and almost 30 percent higher than was the annual real average in the 
previous 8 year period.  Of an increase in direct spending of more than $92 per capita, more than 
a third was in education, and about the same amount in the utility-dominated all other category, 
and the remainder divided among the rest.  
 
Table 4 lists the simple correlations that occurred during this period.  None of the more 
meaningful correlations in the previous period are evident.  In particular, positive state taxes were   16
only slightly associated with real gains state aid to education (r = .3), and the strong relationship 


















Real Per Capita Income 0.142
IG From Fed (Non Welfare) 0.133
IG From Fed (Welfare) 0.195 -0.127
Property Taxes 0.120 0.277 -0.077
IG From State (Non-education) 0.272 0.277 0.114 -0.078
IG From State (Education) 0.300 0.165 0.061 0.018 0.240
Table of Correlations: Real Per Capita Shifts, 2000 to 2002
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The flow of federal funds into state governments does not appear to be the only federalism story 
of the 1992 to 2000 period.  Although the majority of those fund transfers were for Medicaid 
recipients and most of that money, accordingly, was spent directly by the state in support of those 
populations, aid from the federal government for other uses did not correlate with meaningful 
shifts in state tax capacity or their spending in other categories.
13 
 
Real growth in state government receipts during a time of rapid economic growth, however, did 
find its way into a strong correlation with an increase in state education aid to local governments 
and in reduced property taxes for local governments. 
 
The persistent shifts in state spending for higher education that was evidenced in the tables may 
need some additional investigation.  Since the late 1990s, states have aggressively upped their 
direct charges for education (tuitions, charges, and fees) at all levels of higher education, which 
sharply shifts funding for higher education out of tax-based general sources to charge-based 
general sources.  In addition, over this time, institutions of higher education became more and 
more important as research institutions and recipients of national and private research funding, 
which in turn leads to increases in their output and their costs. 
 
Real gains in state spending in support of local education, however, likely happen on two fronts:  
most states are investing directly in local education, especially in services and programs to 
improve math and science instruction, and in the provision of more technological resources into 
classrooms.  On another front, states are still working out the kinks in their education funding 
equalization systems that help to offset differential local funding capacities.  In all, however, the 
fraction of state and local effort in support of primary and secondary education is expanding and 
is a larger fraction of combined budgets than was the case a decade ago. 
                                                 
13 Much larger correlations tables were constructed.  Federal aid, controlling for Medicaid and non-
Medicaid transfers, did not correlate even moderately (r > .4) with any state revenue or direct spending item 
except welfare spending.   17
 
The more recent period is muddled.  There is no evidence that, on the whole, the states abandoned 
their commitments to education or to local governments in general during the recent fiscal stress.  
There is evidence of an increased flow of federal funds into the states, but those funds flowed 
primarily into Medicaid and into homeland security categories, not into broad state governmental 
services and capacities.  There was evidence that the states maintained  their efforts in support of 
education despite constraints on their receipts during the 2000 to 2002 period. 
 
An argument could be made that without the upped flow of federal Medicaid funds, the states 
could not have afforded their generosity to local governments, and education in particular.  
Maybe, but the states’ commitments to Medicaid spending rise, per recipient, more slowly than 
the federal cost, and the states aggressively seek to control health care costs in an attempt to limit 
their exposure.  More research needs to be conducted to sort out the more precise effect of federal 
Medicaid flows on state accounts.  Our findings indicate that they account for a very large 
fraction of modern increases in state spending.  One would reasonably conclude that there is an 
upward limit to the states’ abilities to absorb those increases without it affecting their 
commitments to other programs and to local governments.  And given the massive increase in 
federal spending during the current administration, there is also a looming upper limit in federal 
future federal transfers as well. 
 
_______ 
Research note:  this research is ongoing.  We originally proposed a local governments dimension, 
where we were to investigate whether, over the fiscal 1997 to 2002 period, there were differences 
in the flow of, primarily, state funds into local governments controlling for rural, urban, and 
metropolitan governments, and whether there were, as a result, differential shifts in local capacity 
attributable to those flows.   18
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